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Abstract: In recent years, dynamic user verification has become one of the basic pillars for insider
threat detection. From these threats, the research presented in this paper focuses on masquerader
attacks, a category of insiders characterized by being intentionally conducted by persons outside the
organization that somehow were able to impersonate legitimate users. Consequently, it is assumed
that masqueraders are unaware of the protected environment within the targeted organization, so it
is expected that they move in a more erratic manner than legitimate users along the compromised
systems. This feature makes them susceptible to being discovered by dynamic user verification
methods based on user profiling and anomaly-based intrusion detection. However, these approaches
are susceptible to evasion through the imitation of the normal legitimate usage of the protected
system (mimicry), which is being widely exploited by intruders. In order to contribute to their
understanding, as well as anticipating their evolution, the conducted research focuses on the
study of mimicry from the standpoint of an uncharted terrain: the masquerade detection based
on analyzing locality traits. With this purpose, the problem is widely stated, and a pair of novel
obfuscation methods are introduced: locality-based mimicry by action pruning and locality-based
mimicry by noise generation. Their modus operandi, effectiveness, and impact are evaluated by a
collection of well-known classifiers typically implemented for masquerade detection. The simplicity
and effectiveness demonstrated suggest that they entail attack vectors that should be taken into
consideration for the proper hardening of real organizations.
Keywords: insider threats; masquerade attacks; adversarial machine learning; mimicry; dynamic
user verification
1. Introduction
Traditionally, the hardening of Communication and Information Systems (CIS) has focused on
defining perimeters and securing assets from potential threats that come from outside the protected
organizations. However, and as explicitly indicated by the European Agency for Network and
Information Security (ENISA) in its latest threat report [1], “the insider threat may exist within every
company or organization. Any current or former employee, partner or contractor that has or used to
have access to the organisation’ digital assets, may intentionally or unintentionally abuse this access”,
which has led to the need for implementing protection measures against compromised elements
within the organization itself. It also poses data privacy concerns as a major drawback caused by
insiders when attempting to perpetrate data breaches and, thus, jeopardizing critical information
assets, amongst them economical loss and reputation damage. According to the ENISA report, 77%
of the data breaches were caused by insiders, which posed a 48% increase on the previous year.
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The motivations of these intruders may be widely varied, including emotional, political, or financial
issues. One of the main causes of this growth is the enormous heterogeneity of the emerging CIS
solutions and communication environments, entailing more than a significant impact on the dynamic
user verification landscape. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [2] has taken
the plunge towards a well-defined data protection framework, where data privacy and protection has
been brought into the mainstream, pursuing the definition of insider threat controls as mandatory
to becoming GDPR compliant. Other initiatives worldwide, such as the new California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA), are making similar efforts towards the same outcome.
Salem et al. [3] classified the internal attackers into three great families on the basis of their
location with respect to the victim organization: traitors, masqueraders, and negligent. Traitors
are persons belonging to the victim organization that perpetrate unauthorized actions against its
assets (modifications, deletions, leaks, etc.). The research community typically assumes that traitors
already know the targeted systems, so their prevention is mainly based on deploying decoys or
deterrence measures, rather than behavioral-based analytics [4,5]. On the contrary, masqueraders
are persons outside the organization, hence they often ignore its infrastructure’s characterization or
systems configuration. They are typically detected by combining user profiling and instantiating
anomaly-based intrusion detection capabilities [6], which were developed under the premise that
they will move in a more erratic manner along the compromised system. Finally, and as pointed out
by Balozian et al. [7], negligent insiders are categorized into willing but unable to comply (lack of
awareness or training), or able but unwilling to comply (opportunistic acts caused by competing goals
or lack of motivation). Since their intention is not to cause harm, negligence can be prevented by
training, human resource actuation, audits, and a proper implementation of the organization’s access
control policies.
Due to the close connection between the existing masquerade attack detection approaches and
the behavioral-based user verification solutions [8], these insider threats have been selected as the
primary subject of study of the research presented in this paper. It is important to highlight that insider
detection is inherently tied with the privacy concerns stated so far and, in turn, addresses the CIA
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability) security principles. In recent years, several efforts have
been made by the research community to support the cybersecurity practitioners in their fight against
similar threats. However, the in-depth review of the bibliography reveals several challenges when
operating in current commutation scenarios, such as difficulties when modeling data extracted from
very heterogeneous sources [9], high consumption of computational resources, weak adaptability to
non-stationarity (concept drift), and susceptibility to evasion methods based on adversarial machine
learning [10], the latter being the main target of the presented research. Previous efforts towards
mitigating evasion tactics based on imitating the legitimate usage model have been performed in
the field of the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) based on action sequence analysis [6]. However,
there is a growing tendency to analyze the user behavior on the basis of the locality of its actions for
masquerade detection purposes [11], including traits such as movements in the directory tree, depth
of the accessed files, or the longest paths browsed within the protected system. However, despite
their relevance, the problem of the evasion based on mimicry has been barely studied in this context.
Bearing this in mind, the main contributions of the conducted research are enumerated as follows:
(1) a review of the evasion of masquerader detection systems based on the analysis of locality traits;
(2) two novel evasion tactics (locality-based mimicry by action pruning and locality-based mimicry by
noise generation) that evidence the weaknesses of the conventional machine learning-based solutions
applied to masquerade detection; (3) experimental evidences of the vulnerability of state-of-the-art
classifiers against those threats; and (4) a comprehensive discussion of the research findings.
The paper is organized into six sections, the first being the present introduction. Section 2 describes
the masquerader detection landscape and the main features of the adversarial tactics based on imitation.
Section 3 presents the design principles, reference dataset, and selected algorithms for evaluation
purposes. Section 4 introduces novel obfuscation approaches for disguising adversarial behaviors as
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legitimate activities. Section 5 presents the experimental results observed when evaluating the selected
algorithms against the introduced threats. Finally, Section 6 explains the acquired conclusions and
future work.
2. Background
Due to the important challenge masquerade detection poses today, this problem has been widely
studied by the research community [12]. Since the first contributions in the late 1990s, the behavior of
the users in the protected system has been analyzed by looking for traits of malicious activities [13,14].
This has also led to numerous bibliographic reviews and taxonomies, with Liu et al. [15] being one
of the most recent. There, the attacker steps and available countermeasures were compared with
the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC), which was previously adopted for Advanced Persistent Threat (ATP)
recognition. Another recent analysis of the state-of-the-art was presented in Homoliak et al. [16],
where a trend toward implementing anomaly-based and unsupervised outlier approaches was
observed. Its authors noticed that this is due to two reasons: (1) the acquisition of real and complete
datasets is complicated, which usually leads to class imbalance; and (2) there is a generalized fear of
never-seen-before intrusion attempts (zero-day attacks), so most researchers have neglected detection
paradigms based on signature recognition. In Maestre Vidal et al. [6] the masquerade detection
strategies were separated according to their studying object, distinguishing those that analyze how the
users interact with the system (mouse dynamics [11], keystrokes [17], interaction with touchpads [18]
etc.); from those focused on investigating the final purpose of their actions (system calls [19], Operative
System events [20], etc.). Liu et al. distinguished three major groups of proposals based on the
operational environment [15]: host-based, network-based and contextual-based masquerade detection
systems; which are described below.
Most of the literature focuses on the analysis of features monitored at host level, as is the case of
executed commands, system calls, keystroke/mouse dynamics, Windows events, etc. A good example
of these approaches is illustrated in Happa et al. [21], where an automated anomaly detection method
that used Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) for modeling the normal behavior of employees was
introduced. A Deep Neural Network (DNN)-based masquerade detection system was proposed in
Yuan et al. [22]. There, similarly to natural language modeling, Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) was
considered for learning the language of user behaviors through their actions and extracting abstracted
temporal features. In Sallam et al. [23] a system to detect, alert, and respond to anomalies in database
access designed specifically for relational Database Management Systems (DBMS) was presented,
which built profiles of normal user and application behavior, on the basis of their interaction with the
monitored database during a training phase.
On the other hand, the analysis of characteristics extracted from the activity of users in a network
environment has proved to be a very viable alternative to the mere study of features at the host level,
such as network logs, flow-based analysis, or accesses to remote assets [15]. This is particularly relevant
when considering monitoring scenarios such as edge computing, the Internet of Things (IoT), or 5G [24],
where the ultimate purpose is to discover masqueraders misbehaving thorough communication
networks [25,26] and/or prevent malicious actions originated from them [27,28]. For example, in
Sohal et al. [29] Hidden Markov Models, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and Virtual Honeypot
Devices (VHD) were combined for identifying insiders in fog computing environments. In these
grounds, a two-stage Hidden Markov Models (HMM) was built for effectively categorizing edge
devices in four different levels: legitimate devices (LD), sensitive devices (SD), under-attack devices
(UD), and hacked devices (HD). In Sotelo Monge et al. [30], flow-based analysis allows to prevent
source-side attacks originated in compromised end-points.
As a more recent category, Liu et al. [15] revealed a new group of proposals labeled as contextual
data-based analytics. They considered information about the human user rather than the machine, such
as human resource (HR) or psychological data. According to the literature, it is generally believed that
the intentional attempts at misbehaving can be recognized, thus anticipating the attacks [31]. A classical
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approach that took advantage of this philosophy was ELICIT (Exploit Latent Information to Counter
Insider Threats), which addressed the insider detection problem on the basis of a ‘need-to-know’
principle [32], as well as correlating both network traffic and contextual data. Another example is
illustrated in Ackerman et al. [33], where the main purpose was to predict insider attacks derived
from behavioral, computer, and psycho-social risk factors by using System Dynamics methodologies.
In particular, a stock-flow diagram was built for system modeling. It represented the probabilistic
human behavior of the attacker and deterministic behaviors of the system.
The in-depth review of the bibliography allows to deduce that, with the exception of the
approaches for masquerade detection based on biometrics, the bulk of the publications in the
state-of-the-art focused on studying and modeling user behaviors within the protected organizations
by mainly considering sequences of legitimate actions, from which outlying intrusion attempts were
revealed. In general terms, the main concerns of the research community rely on the improvement of
the sensor hit rate, reduction of the number of false positives, and more recently, providing solutions
strengthened against evasion methods, as is the case of the mimicry attacks [6]. The most accepted
mimicry attack representation was introduced in Giffin et al. [34]. Accordingly, these threats were
understood as obfuscation actions that attempted to thwart classifiers based on machine learning
models built on legitimate samples of the legitimate system usage. The latter became particularly
important after the research published by Tapiador et al. [35], where it was demonstrated that most of
the proposals in the bibliography are susceptible to this kind of adversarial attack. As these threats are
growing in current information systems [1], it is increasingly necessary to devise innovative defensive
strategies capable of dealing with them [36]. In order to collaborate with their mitigation, previous
research [6] introduced a novel masquerade detection method that is robust against evasion strategies
based on mimicry. It adapted local sequence alignment algorithms provided by bioinformatics with
the purpose of scoring the similarity between action sequences performed by users, bearing in mind
their regions of greatest resemblance. The strengthening against imitation-based evasion was achieved
by partitioning long sequences in order to make the small traits of intrusions more visible and by
concurrent analysis of new sequences when suspicious events are discovered. However, this approach
became obsolete when applied to insider detection based on studying the locality of the monitored
actions [11,37]. The proper statement of the problem inherent in their mitigation requires analyzing
the possible modus operandi of the attacker, which is addressed through this research. The next
comprehensive step is to design and develop locality-based mimicry detectors, which will be targeted
as future research stages.
3. Design Principles
In this section, the design principles of the performed research are explained, including motivation,
objectives, experimental methodology, dataset, and the machine learning algorithms considered during
the evaluation process.
3.1. Motivation and Objectives
Despite the fact that the conducted research presents offensive techniques capable of evading
masquerader attack detection systems, its principal purpose is raising awareness about the alarming
increase in the exploitation of mimicry techniques, their capabilities, and modus operandi, which are
expected to support the design and development of more efficient countermeasures and strengthening
tactics. Bearing this in mind, it can be stated that the main objective of the research is to contribute
to pushing the study of adversarial attacks to the forefront of the research community engaged with
insider detection and on focusing on those approached by analyzing the locality traits of the user
behavior. This has been addressed by assuming secondary objectives, such as performing a wide review
of the insider detection landscape, introducing novel adversarial methods based on mimicry, and
comparing the potential impact of these strategies on conventional machine learning-based enablers
for masquerade detection.
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3.2. Experimental Research
Although a preliminarily study of the masquerade detection landscape laid the grounds for
the research presented in this paper, the validation of the hypothesized adversarial tactics was
conducted on the grounds of experimental research, from which: (1) a suitable dataset was identified
as the baseline of the attributes/variables to be alternated with empirical purposes; (2) a set of
well-known classifiers based on machine learning were selected to demonstrate their weakness against
the developed evasion attacks; and (3) the evasion tactics were applied on the dataset, whose samples
allowed to evaluate the strengthening of these classifiers against mimicry threats. In particular, the
following activities were conducted during the experimentation:
• The selected classifiers were applied upon the reference dataset to set up a baseline of accuracy
measurements.
• The evasion tactics introduced in this research were applied on the raw observations (e.g., system
call sequences, file navigation patterns, log entries, and so on) to generate adversarial datasets
with the same features presented in the reference repository.
• The classification algorithms were applied upon the adversarial datasets and the variation on
accuracy results was measured to cross-validate the masquerading effectiveness achieved by the
obfuscation methods. To this end, different calibrations were exercised in the generation of the
adversarial samples.
The better the understanding of the targeted system (modus operandi), the higher the probability
that the attackers are enabled to hide their malicious activities against the victim system. Then, it is
expected to observe a degradation of the detection accuracy as the intruder gathers more legitimate
observations to hide the malicious actions targeting the victim system. This assumption lays the
alternate hypothesis of this research. Consequently, the experiments have considered the number of
legitimate monitored observations as the sensitive parameter for which the detection accuracy has
been tested.
3.3. Reference Dataset
After an arduous bibliographic review, it was difficult to find datasets focused on locality-based
features with meticulous labeling, sufficient size, and detailed information on the characteristics
perpetrated per system user. Among them, the Windows-Users and Intruder simulations Logs
(WUIL) [38], which provides significant information about both user activity, in terms of file system
usage, and, unlike rival datasets, faithful masquerade attempts. It was built under the working
hypothesis that to characterize user behavior, the IDS should analyze the way it navigates the
file system structure. The implemented file system navigation comprises two key aspects: (1) the
object upon which users conduct actions and information about how these objects were used over
a monitoring session (2) and the compilation of the activities perpetrated by 20 users during 13–54
logged days on different versions of the Windows operative system. These users belonged to the
same organization and played various roles: manager, secretary, programmers, sales, students, and
so forth. The attacks were collected by gamified tests, such as questionnaires, Capture the Flag (CTF)
exercises, and so forth; and they were performed by basic, intermediate, and advanced adversaries.
The following behavioral traits about accesses were taken into consideration: path distance, maximum
distance rate, average distance, diameter, proportion of distinct file names accessed, maximum access
frequency rate, frequency of accesses’ sum of time between same file name accesses, maximum time
between same file name accesses, average time between same file name accesses, and direction (north,
south, west, east).
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3.4. Machine-Learning Base Classifiers
A set of classifiers widely used in the research literature have been considered in order to
determine the behavioral patterns of the obfuscation methods and their impact on the overall detection
accuracy. The first group of classifiers include Random Forest, Reducing Error Pruning Tree, and
C4.5 as learning algorithms in which the decision tree models of the input variables (features) are
built in order to predict the value of the target variable (class). A Random Forest [39] representation
consists of an internal collection of tree-structured predictors, such that each tree depends on the
values of a random vector sampled independently and with the same distribution for all trees in the
forest. Similarly, Reducing Error Pruning Tree (REPTree) [40] is a simple approach based on the most
relevant classes in order to reduce the size of the result-ant decision trees by pruning sections that
provide little effect on the performed predictions. Likewise, C4.5 [41] relies on information entropy for
building decision trees which assume the normalized information gain as splitting criteria, in which
the attribute with the highest gain takes precedence. On the other hand, the second group of classifiers
include Bootstrap Aggregation, Naïve Bayes, and Support Vector Machines—each following a different
approach. Bootstrap Aggregation [42], also known as Bagging, is an ensemble algorithm that combines
several base models (classifiers) in order to produce a unified predictive model. It shares many
similarities with Random Forest in the sense that submodels are accounted for in the overall efficiency,
but unlike them, in Bootstrap Aggregation, all features are considered for splitting. Apart from that,
Naïve Bayes [43] proposes a simplistic approach based on the Bayes theorem based on the following
principle: every feature being classified is independent of the value of any other feature. It leads
to a combination of simpler and faster Bayesian networks requiring less training data. In addition,
Support Vector Machines [44] are a collection of algorithms intended to calculate a hyperplane in an
N-dimensional space that separates samples into classes.
4. Obfuscation of Locality-Based Evidences
The obfuscation of malicious behaviors based on manipulating traits related to the location of the
actions perpetrated by masqueraders entails an additional challenge with regard to the conventional
padding procedures, which are typically implemented for thwarting sequential-based analytics [6,45]:
this differentiating aspect is the need for manipulating the metrics that summarize the user behavior
while bearing in mind the temporal granularity in which they are generated (see Figure 1). This is
achieved by executing additional actions or their prevention, thus poisoning the metrics processed by
the IDS for insider detection on behalf of the attacker. The mimicry attack procedures that support the
present research assume a grey-box [46] attack model under the following premises:
• As indicated by Tapiador et al. [35], and regardless of the level of obfuscation of malicious
actions, they will always present a small invariant trait that shall allow to recognize their true
malicious nature.
• The adversary knows the detection method and all the relevant information about its operation.
However, it is unaware of the reference datasets considered for training the classifiers and outlier
detection capabilities inherent in modern IDS.
• The activities perpetrated by the system users can be monitored and collected by the adversary
with the purpose of supporting the orchestration of evasion procedures [6,35].
• The adversary has the capability of conducting padding/noise activities within the time interval
in which each observation is defined. They will impact on the values calculated for the behavioral
metrics that model the legitimate usage pattern.
• The detection system applies ideal models of legitimate and malicious system usage. Therefore,
neither their poisoning, nor improvement is possible [35].
This research assumes an adversarial modus operandi that behaves as follows: once the
intruder reaches the targeted system, the next l1, l2, . . . , lm legitimate observations are monitored.
The m1, m2, . . . , mk statistical features that model the legitimate system usage are extracted from them,
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which will establish the basis for defining an adversarial reference model M(A) (see Section 4.3). From
this model, two obfuscation procedures have been considered.
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Figure 1. Orchestration of locality-based mimicry.
4.1. Locality-Based Mimicry by Action Pruning
The locality-based mimicry by action pruning approach assumes that the adversary may limit
its adversarial activities. In this way, it is possible to prevent that the statistical features derived
from its behavior exceed certain T(m1), T(m2), . . . , T(mk) upper thresholds deduced from M(A). This
paradigm has been instantiated with experimental purposes in such a way that when mi > T(mi)1 ≤
i ≤ m, any action that may increase the value of mi is avoided or postponed to the next monitoring
period; so it will not be taken into consideration in the present observation. For example, if the
action “access the file f” affects the metric mi =”Average time between same File name accesses” and
mi > T(mi), the adversary will delay its execution to the beginning of a new observation gathering
period. In Figure 2, an example of this case is illustrated, where according to a preliminary planning,
the action a4 should be executed at the monitoring period that constructs Observation 1 to be analyzed
by the IDS. If this original planning is executed, the threshold T (mi) = 3 will be exceeded, since mi = 4
consequently mi > T(mi), which a priory will differ in a significant way of M(A). If an adversary
delays the execution of a4 to the next monitoring period (Observation 2), then mi = 3 at Observation 1
and mi = 3 at Observation 2. This results in malicious behaviors with a greater resemblance to the
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Figure 2. Locality-based mimicry by action pruning.
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4.2. Locality-Based Mimicry by Noise Generation
The locality-based mimicry by noise generation approach assumes that the adversary may conduct
padding actions (noise). They may distort the metrics generated per monitoring period. Bearing in
mind the adversarial model M(A), T(m1), T(m2), . . . , T(mk) lower thresholds will be generated. When
some certain T(mi) is not reached within the observation interval, the attacker will conduct padding
activities targeted at increasing the values of the attributes considered for its calculation. In analogy
with the previous example, let the action “access the file f” that affects the metric mi=”Average time
between same File name accesses”, and the condition mi < T(mi), the adversary will continue
accessing random files with this purpose if reaching the condition mi ≥ T(mi). In Figure 3, an example
of this procedure is illustrated. Accordingly, the original planning of the intrusion activities considers
the execution of three actions: a1, a2, and a3. The upper threshold of mi is T(mi) = 4, but under normal
circumstances mi = 3, which triggers the condition mi < T(mi) that indicates a clear divergence of
Observation 1 regarding M(A). The adversarial may perform padding actions to reach mi = 4, in this
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Figure 3. Locality-based mimicry by noise generation.
4.3. Adversarial Model and Thresholds
At present there is a large ecosystem of modeling and knowledge representation strategies capable
of facilitating the construction of the adversarial model M(A) from l1, l2, . . . , lm [47]. The nature of the
research problem suggested the need to assume two fundamental requirements in order to select the
most appropriate techniques:
• The m size of the reference dataset is small, since it is not possible to pretend that the adversary
spends long periods of inactivity capturing information without being discovered. To avoid this,
actions like privilege gain, hiding (bulletproof), or vulnerability exploitation may be conducted
within the victim’s system. Consequently, any implemented modeling tool based on machine
learning should present sufficient effectiveness when dealing with small training datasets.
• The machine learning enablers behind the M(A) modeling must be agile enough to allow the
valuation of the observations in real time. From the models they built, it must be possible to
specify a set of upper/lower thresholds T(m1), T(m2), . . . , T(mk) for guiding the actions inherent
in the obfuscation process.
Bearing in mind these assumptions, during the experimentation, adversarial models were
constructed on the basis of decision trees [48]. They pose diagrams of logical constructions that
model events derived from observations, in this case, the factual knowledge brought by l1, l2, . . . , lm.
Accordingly, each node assumes a premise about certain attributes, each branch indicates its valuation,
and each leaf is the classification of the observation (labeling decisions). Over the past years, different
algorithms have been planned for decision tree definition, among them ID3 [49], C4.5 [41], or CART [50].
In [51], some of these techniques are reviewed, and metrics for facilitate the understanding of such
models are explored. As indicated in Buczak et al. [52], the main advantages of decision trees are
their intuitive way of representing knowledge, great precision and ease of implementation; which
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facilitated the definition of the decision thresholds. However, they also pose some drawbacks, among
them difficulties when dealing with categorical data with a variable number of values [53] or their
sensitivity to small variations.
5. Experimental Results
Firstly, classification has been performed on the original WUIL dataset in order to quantify the
overall accuracy when predicting both the legitimate and threatening situations described in [38].
Experiments were performed in Weka [54], guided by the battery of machine learning algorithms
implemented in this framework. Following the methodology introduced in Section 3.2, three
experimental scenarios have been considered: a baseline scenario performed on the original WUIL
dataset, the locality-based mimicry by action pruning scenario, and the locality-based mimicry by
noise generation.
5.1. Baseline Scenario: WUIL Dataset
The WUIL dataset was processed to label the three masquerader attack-types (basic, intermediate,
and advanced, as noted in Section 3.3) and the legitimate samples accordingly. Under such
consideration, the first experimental scenario is run to acquire the classification accuracy for each of
the algorithms described in Section 3.4, and the obtained results are detailed in Table 1. Decision tree
algorithms (Random Forest, REPTree, and C4.5) performed similarly, with Random Forest reaching
the highest accuracy (98.22%), closely followed by Bootstrap Aggregation. The lowest performance
(94.24%) was achieved by Naïve Bayes but it is important to take into account the faster and simpler
modeling suggested by this approach.
Table 1. Classification accuracy (%) for the original WUIL dataset.
Dataset Random Forest SVM REPTree Bagging C4.5 Naïve Bayes
Original 98.22 97.76 97.95 98.11 97.91 94.24
5.2. Locality-Based Scenario: WUIL dataset with Action Pruning
Since the masquerading methods introduced so far hypothesize that obfuscating malicious
samples by interleaving legitimate actions leads to a lower detection accuracy, the obfuscation methods
described in Section 4 were exercised. The first of them was the local-based mimicry for which the
classification accuracy was evaluated following the methodology applied for the WUIL dataset but
considering a variable number of observations gathered by the intruder to infer the modus operandi
of the protected system. Table 2 gives a summary of the accuracy levels reached by each classifier.
Taking into account the baseline measurements described in Table 1, a similar performance per classifier
can be noted. It is observed that there are even higher accuracy levels when the obfuscation is modeled
on the basis of 10 or 100 legitimate observations, meaning that in both situations the intruder has
not acquired enough observations to rely on. In the opposite case, when the number of legitimate
observations is higher or equal than 500, all the classifiers reported are lesser accuracy measurements,
hence, evidencing situations in which the intruder’s decisions (i.e., pruning actions) are reasonably
conducted, due to a more representative set of legitimate observations.
5.3. Locality-Based Scenario: WUIL Dataset with Noise Generation
The same approach has been followed for assessing the accuracy levels derived from the second
obfuscation method laying on noise generation. Table 3 summarizes the accuracy levels per classifier
under different numbers of observations.
Sensors 2020, 20, 2084 10 of 14
Table 2. Classification accuracy (%) for action pruning.
No Obs. Random Forest SVM REPTree Bagging C4.5 Naïve Bayes
10 99.17 98.76 98.82 99.02 98.83 97.92
100 99.12 98.75 98.80 98.91 98.81 97.22
500 98.13 96.85 97.06 97.64 97.42 77.95
750 97.27 94.59 95.70 96.5 96.32 76.57
1000 96.23 92.17 93.67 95.29 94.13 77.37
1500 92.99 88.13 89.23 91.06 89.58 74.78
2000 91.40 87.20 88.43 90.29 88.73 82.34
2500 90.87 85.26 86.71 88.61 87.98 79.23
3000 89.05 82.45 84.63 86.64 86.09 75.82
3500 85.68 78.44 81.11 82.90 81.65 71.42
4000 84.81 78.41 80.17 81.81 80.51 75.80
6000 85.26 78.81 80.45 83.34 82.09 75.35
Table 3. Classification accuracy (%) for noise generation.
No Obs. Random Forest SVM REPTree Bagging C4.5 Naïve Bayes
10 98.23 97.69 97.91 98.12 97.88 94.16
100 98.68 97.95 98.25 98.45 98.22 97.84
500 97.56 94.28 96.69 96.89 96.86 64.30
750 96.34 90.11 94.57 95.50 94.78 58.57
1000 94.73 84.12 92.18 93.25 92.24 58.44
1500 89.14 66.42 83.65 86.23 84.52 60.42
2000 83.91 68.71 76.47 80.22 77.61 67.18
2500 80.82 63.41 72.19 76.34 74.76 62.85
3000 77.15 59.13 67.52 71.97 69.06 56.35
3500 70.28 50.57 58.02 64.83 60.91 47.35
4000 70.31 51.95 58.58 64.64 58.75 47.48
6000 70.08 51.78 57.84 63.28 60.51 47.53
As in the previous experiment (action pruning), the classification accuracy showed higher
measurements in the first two situations (10 and 100 observations), but the overall accuracy when
categorizing legitimate and attack situations exposes a steady reduction as the number of observations
raises. A closer look at the results suggests a better performance of the locality-based mimicry by noise
generation when contrasting the obtained metrics per classifier. Taking Random Forest as an example,
an average accuracy of 85.60% outperforms the 92.44% accounted for the pruning-based method. Even
for the least-effective classifier (Naïve Bayes), the same pattern is observed with 63.54% in favor of the
noise-generation-based method contrasted with the 80.14% achieved by its pruning-based counterpart.
6. Discussion
The paper introduced two novel adversarial tactics: locality-based mimicry by action pruning
and locality-based mimicry by noise generation, which particularly focus on thwarting the disrupting
locality-based masquerade detection paradigm. This raises a promising line of defense against smart
insider threats, but as demonstrated in the submitted research, remains vulnerable against targeted
mimicry masquerade attacks. The preliminary research already echoed the drawbacks of recognizing
obfuscated masquerade actions at conventional scenarios [6,35], which reviewed detection, evasion,
and strengthening against adversarial methods. The quantitative comparison of the presented results
regarding these previous publications is not viable because:
• There are no preliminary studies about the feasibility of locality-based masquerade detectors
concerning the specific adversarial tactics able to evade them.
• There is no functional standard adopted by the research community for assessing locality-based
classifiers. Although, to the best of these authors knowledge, WUIL (Windows-Users and Intruder
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simulations) is one of the most complete and well documented collections, there are no preliminary
studies on WUIL with focus on evasion.
• There are no standardized measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
concerning mimicry-based obfuscation tactics.
From a qualitative perspective, the following differentiating aspects should be highlighted:
• The proposal introduces pioneering adversarial methods against locality-based analytics.
• Unlike most of the state-of-the-art contributions, the proposed techniques can be applied at run
time. Note that most of the previous, related publications already conducted static modifications
on predefined datasets. The introduced tactics are able to step-wise guide the insider when
operating in the compromised environment, which make them more applicable in real uses cases.
• Locality-based mimicry by action pruning prevents the insider from conducting highly detectable
actions by suggesting their avoidance or delay to the beginning of a new IDS observation
gathering cycle.
• Locality-based mimicry by noise generation guides the insider towards conducting locality-based
padding actions in order to resemble the targeted legitimate usage model.
• The effectiveness of the evasion tactics was compared with the results presented in the original
WUIL [38] publication, which includes well-known classification algorithms like SVM, REPTree,
Bagging, or Naive Bayes. This sets the grounds for further research, as well as facilitates the
definition of a benchmark for future related research actions.
• As presented in Table 3, when the number of legitimate preliminary observations observed by the
attacker is significant, the accuracy of the detection methods decreases considerably. For example,
the 94.24% accuracy of Naive Bayes was reduced to 75.35% by adversarial action pruning, and to
47.53% by adversarial noise generation.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, the problem of detecting adversarial methods on the basis of mimicry against
locality-based classifiers has been studied in detail. An exhaustive revision of the state-of-the-art
has been conducted, from which locality-based mimicry by action pruning and noise generation
were presented as effective methods for thwarting conventional machine-learning-based masquerade
detection capabilities. The first of them assumed that the attacker might limit its intrusion activities
according to guidelines triggered by adversarial models, and the second considered that adversaries
might conduct padding actions with a similar guidance. These tactics serve to demonstrate in the
WUIL dataset that some of the classical machine learning enablers applied to masquerade detection
operated inaccurately in the face of these threats. The two obfuscation methods have proven effective
with promising results when hindering the detective capabilities of the defensive system expressed
as the accurate detection of both legitimate and attack situations. In particular, the locality-based
mimicry by noise generation slightly outperformed the padding-based method, but both approaches
strengthened the importance of acquiring a representative set of observations for building a more
robust adversarial model. These outcomes encouraged the beginning of the design of strengthening
capabilities against similar adversarial behaviors, which are the focus of our current activities that
extend from this line of research.
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